equally against the Materialists and me.
HYL. Ay, Philonous, but they suppose an external archetype, to
which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive
the same thing.
PHIL. And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so
may you suppose an external archetype on my principles;--EXTERNAL, _I_
MEAN, TO YOUR OWN MIND: though indeed it must be' supposed to exist in
that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the
ends of IDENTITY, as well as if it existed out of a mind. And I am sure
you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.
HYL. You have indeed clearly satisfied me--either that there is no
difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes
equally against both opinions.
PHIL. But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions
can be a proof against neither.
HYL. I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous, when I consider
the substance of what you advance against SCEPTICISM, it amounts to no
more than this: We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word,
that we are affected with sensible impressions.
PHIL. And how are WE concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel
it, I taste it: and I am sure NOTHING cannot be seen, or felt, or
tasted: it is therefore red. Take away the sensations of softness,
moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is
not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a
congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses:
which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by
the mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the
palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected
with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I
see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the
cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing
abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word CHERRY you, mean
an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its
EXISTENCE something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I
own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.
HYL. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very
same reasons against the existence of sensible things IN A MIND, which
you have offered against their existing IN A MATERIAL SUBST
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