no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you
may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all
you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither
do you pretend they exist without the mind.
HYL. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.
PHIL. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I
should have seen things produced into being--that is become
perceptible--in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever
before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no
alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or
end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but
His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the
same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things,
before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible
to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect
to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the
creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became
gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties;
so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them.
This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the
Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of
SUBSTRATUM, INSTRUMENT, OCCASION, or ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. And, upon
inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who
believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What
metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.
HYL. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created
things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical
being: that is to say, upon supposition there were MEN to perceive
them; without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein
creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly
impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of
man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?
PHIL. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to
exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will
not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my
notions, unless you first shew there was no other order
|