You have satisfied me, Philonous.
PHIL. But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider:
That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be
proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if
you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the MATERIALISTS.
Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you
cannot conceive it easier by the help of MATERIALISM, it is plain it
can be no objection against IMMATERIALISM. Had you proceeded all along
by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of
trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to
shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more
unintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes
rather AGAINST than FOR it. You should consider, in each particular,
whether the difficulty arises from the NON-EXISTENCE OF MATTER. If it
doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of
extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty
against IMMATERIALISM. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will
find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should
likewise take heed not to argue on a PETITIO PRINCIPII. One is apt to
say--The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than
the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external
substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our
ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such
external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question?
But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that
vulgar sophism which is called IGNORATIO ELENCHI. You talked often as
if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas
in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I
am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it.
Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses,
is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; but not on yours.
Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it
may be termed SOMEWHAT), which is quite stripped of all sensible
qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the
mind. Remember I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft,
hot or cold, blue or white, round or s
|