think there are two kinds of
objects:--the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called
IDEAS; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the
mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I
own ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects
do. I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner; it would
probably have cut short your discourse.

PHIL. Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other
faculty?

HYL. They are perceived by sense.

PHIL. Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not
immediately perceived?

HYL. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on
a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to
perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.

PHIL. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are
immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these
also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or
resemblance to our ideas?

HYL. That is my meaning.

PHIL. And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is
nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves
imperceptible, are perceived by sense.

HYL. In the very same.

PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do
you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a
certain symmetry and composition of the whole?

HYL. Nothing else.

PHIL. And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar
see as much?

HYL. He would.

PHIL. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect
a degree as you?

HYL. I agree with you.

PHIL. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman
emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or
ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no
advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed
from reason and memory: should it not?

HYL. It should.

PHIL. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything
is perceived by sense which is not, immediately perceived. Though I grant
we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately
by sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the
immediate perception of ideas by one sense SUGGESTS to the mind others,
perhaps belonging to another se