his morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that I had
not leisure to think of the time of the day, or indeed of anything else.

PHILONOUS. I am glad you were so intent upon it, in hopes if there were
any mistakes in your concessions, or fallacies in my reasonings from
them, you will now discover them to me.

HYL. I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but search
after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have minutely examined
the whole series of yesterday's discourse: but all in vain, for the
notions it led me into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident;
and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do they force my
assent.

PHIL. And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, that
they proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason? Truth and
beauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both off to
advantage; while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure
being reviewed, or too nearly inspected.

HYL. I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be
more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long
as I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these are
out of my thoughts, there seems, on the other hand, something so
satisfactory, so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of
explaining things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it.

PHIL. I know not what way you mean.

HYL. I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas.

PHIL. How is that?

HYL. It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the
brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to
all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different
impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain
vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits
propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which, according
to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is
variously affected with ideas.

PHIL. And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are
affected with ideas?

HYL. Why not, Philonous? Have you anything to object against it?

PHIL. I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis.
You make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our
ideas. Pray tell me whether by the BRAIN you mean any sensible thing.

HYL. Wha