nse, which are wont to be connected with
them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets,
immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have
had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the
coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing
can be HEARD BUT SOUND; and the coach is not then properly perceived by
sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see
a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the
objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and
figure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things
alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have
been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on
us. As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind
by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to your
comparison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you
must hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived
by sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory.
I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for
the existence of what you call REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS. Or,
whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in
themselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did.

HYL. I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will
never convince me.

PHIL. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge
of MATERIAL BEINGS. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or
mediately: by sense, or by reason and reflexion. But, as you have
excluded sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe their
existence; or what MEDIUM you can possibly make use of to prove it,
either to mine or your own understanding.

HYL. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not
find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seems pretty
plain, that it is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as
long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe
as I did, till you bring good reasons to the contrary.

PHIL. What! Is it come to this, that you only BELIEVE the existence
of material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the
possibility of its being true? Then you will have m