.

PHIL. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of
extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of
swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?

HYL. I think so.

PHIL. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties,
are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call
them.

HYL. They are.

PHIL. That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in
general.

HYL. Let it be so.

PHIL. But it is a universally received maxim that EVERYTHING WHICH
EXISTS IS PARTICULAR. How then can motion in general, or extension in
general, exist in any corporeal substance?

HYL. I will take time to solve your difficulty.

PHIL. But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you
can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am
content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your
thoughts a distinct ABSTRACT IDEA of motion or extension, divested of
all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and
square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I
will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be
unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no
notion of.

HYL. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

PHIL. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the
ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term
SECONDARY?

HYL. What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by
themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the
mathematicians treat of them?

PHIL. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general
propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any
other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly.
But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word MOTION
by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or,
because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any
mention of GREAT or SMALL, or any other sensible mode or quality,
that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without
any particular size or figure, or sensible quality, should be
distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of
quantity, without regarding what other sensible qualities it is att