ity
what it will--figure, or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it
should subsist in that which doth not perceive it.

HYL. I give up the point for the present, reserving still a right to
retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false step in
my progress to it.

PHIL. That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and extension being
despatched, we proceed next to MOTION. Can a real motion in any
external body be at the same time very swift and very slow?

HYL. It cannot.

PHIL. Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to
the time it takes up in describing any given space? Thus a body that
describes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would in
case it described only a mile in three hours.

HYL. I agree with you.

PHIL. And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as
fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of
another kind?

HYL. I own it.

PHIL. Consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its
motion over any space in half the time that it doth to you. And the same
reasoning will hold as to any other proportion: that is to say, according
to your principles (since the motions perceived are both really in the
object) it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved the
same way at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent
either with common sense, or with what you just now granted?

HYL. I have nothing to say to it.

PHIL. Then as for SOLIDITY; either you do not mean any sensible
quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: or if you do, it
must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are
plainly relative to our senses: it being evident that what seems hard to
one animal may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and
firmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel is not
in the body.

HYL. I own the very SENSATION of resistance, which is all you
immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the CAUSE of that
sensation is.

PHIL. But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately
perceived, and therefore are not sensible. This point I thought had been
already determined.

HYL. I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little
embarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions.

PHIL. T