se
permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow
mines to be placed.

I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the
North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these
requirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be
to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our
naval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade,
although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the further
development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the
background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only
action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success
presupposes the existence of some such fortress.

But the question must be looked at from another aspect.

The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the
unmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England is
determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power.
Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from
claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless,
the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked
menacing utterances from various English statesmen.

If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's military
preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates
attacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of the
English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase
the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly
intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken;
the English _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the German
coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and
to isolate us in Europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted as
a course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quite
impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and
protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly
well that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attempt
would be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the German
naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes
for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an
English attack. We must make it clear to