ly favourable. At the same time the Minister who
conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is
in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of
the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he
must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by
war. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has
of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the
realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the
opponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy of
compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a
permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of
recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one,
but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to
end in political and moral defeat.

The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and
hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and
shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always
creates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory,
tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy,
which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts
favourably on the military situation.

In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can
only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution
join hands.

If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next
war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion:
the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the
necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions
are to be created for the inevitably threatening war.

So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two
fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war
from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was
comparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of various
strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small
compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the
other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive
action on both sides. To-day the situation is different.

We must consider England, as well as France and Russi