Germany, and the assurance that England would
support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the
limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with
England. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not altered
by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new
acquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every new
colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and
that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They form
objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clear
commentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that once
more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates.
In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count
on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a
_rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at
most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may
fairly imagine we have some prospect of success.
If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in
the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world
generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more
face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the
world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any
case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide
that the hour of attack has come.
We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike
preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down.
All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to
represent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of the
people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to
military and political success, without carrying still further the
disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and
frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between
Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will
prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy
which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers
threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs
and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any
conventional scruples d
|