feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led.

In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japan
had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as
military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and
assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Her
policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at
the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment
of her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. She
had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance
with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to
place sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover,
compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of
the Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field against
Japan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparations
required by the political position had been made, although the conflict
had long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrous
retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is no
doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made
resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the
campaign by the offensive.

England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and
consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to
her aims or suited to give weight to political demands.

Two points stand out clearly from this consideration.

First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and
political preparations for war. Proper political preparations for war
are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong
enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing
which he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must be
developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. The
obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace
as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister
and the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with the
all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain
influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs,
and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military
situation is peculiar