nd, it is to
be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases
quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general
situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in
the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war.
My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid
foundation without which any successful action against the superior
forces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications fail
to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible.
It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry
out _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever
may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Though
this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for
the navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything on
strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a
successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain
a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we
must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers.
Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and
German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, we
must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the
coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the
pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be
met by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion.
The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness
for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the
first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the
long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define
and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free
hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing
more and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most serious
mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France
was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was
favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has,
indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace
and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed i
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