ization preparations must therefore be ready for all such
eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the
reservists.

Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to
secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under all
circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready
for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension.
The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole
_materiel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for
instant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the
mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in
force directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simple
precept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance to
the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as
is done in England.

When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are
required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the
navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the
resources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, since
the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the
expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic
preparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or the
self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet
must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast
defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our
requirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be
provisionally dropped.

In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should
limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary,
devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest
stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in
case of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presupposition
that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act
contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on
us. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform
tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we
have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships.

I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one ha