xpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already
stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the
midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our
strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly
effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard
for our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of our
commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only
object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an
instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and
supporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of such
limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. A
few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in
war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible,
destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines is
obviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the
defeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count on
permanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed
that sufficiently.
The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at
sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded
commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies.
It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for
defence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet our
political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed
according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive,
when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success;
on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained
in this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the
Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. We
must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise
which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale.
The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be
calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious that
we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are
weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger,
unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all
circumstances
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