which is equally true of the others, and may be deduced
from the existence of one? There is. One is distinct from the others,
and the others from one; for one and the others are all things, and
there is no third existence besides them. And the whole of one cannot
be in others nor parts of it, for it is separated from others and has
no parts, and therefore the others have no unity, nor plurality, nor
duality, nor any other number, nor any opposition or distinction, such
as likeness and unlikeness, some and other, generation and corruption,
odd and even. For if they had these they would partake either of one
opposite, and this would be a participation in one; or of two opposites,
and this would be a participation in two. Thus if one exists, one is all
things, and likewise nothing, in relation to one and to the others.

2.a. But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not,
and what is the consequence? In the first place, the proposition, that
one is not, is clearly opposed to the proposition, that not one is not.
The subject of any negative proposition implies at once knowledge and
difference. Thus 'one' in the proposition--'The one is not,' must be
something known, or the words would be unintelligible; and again this
'one which is not' is something different from other things. Moreover,
this and that, some and other, may be all attributed or related to
the one which is not, and which though non-existent may and must have
plurality, if the one only is non-existent and nothing else; but if all
is not-being there is nothing which can be spoken of. Also the one which
is not differs, and is different in kind from the others, and therefore
unlike them; and they being other than the one, are unlike the one,
which is therefore unlike them. But one, being unlike other, must be
like itself; for the unlikeness of one to itself is the destruction of
the hypothesis; and one cannot be equal to the others; for that would
suppose being in the one, and the others would be equal to one and like
one; both which are impossible, if one does not exist. The one which
is not, then, if not equal is unequal to the others, and in equality
implies great and small, and equality lies between great and small, and
therefore the one which is not partakes of equality. Further, the one
which is not has being; for that which is true is, and it is true that
the one is not. And so the one which is not, if remitting aught of the
being of non-ex