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dea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning? Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning. And will not knowledge--I mean absolute knowledge--answer to absolute truth? Certainly. And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being? Yes. But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have? Certainly. But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have? No, we cannot. And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge? Yes. And we have not got the idea of knowledge? No. Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge? I suppose not. Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us? It would seem so. I think that there is a stranger consequence still. What is it? Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest? Yes. And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge? Certainly. But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things? Why not? Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them; the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres. Yes, that has been admitted. And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things of men. Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous. These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of the difficulties in which we are involved i
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