o
being later; and in the same way the others are in the same relation to
the one, because they were seen to be older, and prior to the one.

That is clear.

Inasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than another,
in that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one
cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the
one; but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which
came into being later must continually differ from each other by a
different portion--in this point of view the others must become older
and younger than the one, and the one than the others.

Certainly.

For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger
than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger
than itself or the others.

Certainly.

But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and
younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the
future?

Of course it must.

Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming
and will become?

Certainly.

And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it
and belongs to it?

True.

And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of
the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?

Quite right.

Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed,
and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains
to the one.

Certainly, that is true.

Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is
both one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many,
and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times
partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake
of being?

Certainly.

But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake
of being when partaking of being?

Impossible.

Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times,
for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the
same.

True.

And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes
being--for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it
receives and also gives it up at some time?

Impossible.

And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?

I should.

And the relinquishing of being you would ca