passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to
like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation
nor of dissimilation; and in the passage from small to great and equal
and back again, it will be neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a
state of increase, or diminution, or equalization.

True.

All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being.

Of course.

1.aa. But if one is, what will happen to the others--is not that also to
be considered?

Yes.

Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the others
than the one.

Let us do so.

Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the
one; for if they were they could not be other than the one.

Very true.

Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they
participate in the one.

In what way?

Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts;
for if they had no parts they would be simply one.

Right.

And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?

So we say.

And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will
be parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of
a whole.

How do you mean?

If anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will
surely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part
of each one of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some
one, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not
be a part of each one; and if not a part of each, one it will not be a
part of any one of the many; and not being a part of any one, it cannot
be a part or anything else of all those things of none of which it is
anything.

Clearly not.

Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain
single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out
of all--of this the part will be a part.

Certainly.

If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and
in the one.

True.

Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts.

Certainly.

And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate
in the one; for if each of the parts is a part, this means, I suppose,
that it is one separate from the rest and self-related; otherwise it is
not each.

True.

But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearl