ngs was held
by us to be impossible?

Impossible.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were
like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which
would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of
opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to be
impossible.

True.

Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at
rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater,
nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the
sort; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they
will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in
these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are
altogether and in every way devoid of the one.

Very true.

Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in
relation to itself and to other things.

Certainly.

2.a. Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the
consequence if the one is not?

Yes; we ought.

What is the meaning of the hypothesis--If the one is not; is there any
difference between this and the hypothesis--If the not one is not?

There is a difference, certainly.

Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions--if
the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?

They are entirely opposed.

And suppose a person to say:--If greatness is not, if smallness is not,
or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an
expression, that 'what is not' is other than other things?

To be sure.

And so when he says 'If one is not' he clearly means, that what 'is not'
is other than all others; we know what he means--do we not?

Yes, we do.

When he says 'one,' he says something which is known; and secondly
something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference
whether he predicate of one being or not-being, for that which is said
'not to be' is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished
from other things.

Certainly.

Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the
consequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge
of it, or the very meaning of the words, 'if one is not,' would not be
known.

True.

Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as
different from the others?

Certainly.

Difference, then, belongs to it