nd. All of
these persons came to the horse in very much the same frame of
mind--which found a similar expression in all, in both posture and
movements. And it was these motor expressions of the questioner (aside
from the signs for "yes" and "no", which I believe I have adequately
explained on page 98), that the horse needed as stimuli for his
activity.

[Footnote AH: I cannot enter upon a discussion of the latest
psychological problems, here involved, partly because that would
take us beyond the purpose of this monograph, and partly because
they are still moot questions and hence not suited to popular
treatment. Briefly though, they are these: What is the nature of the
relationship between cognitive and affective states on the one hand
and involuntary, (so-called expressive) movements on the other? Is
this connection an external thing, as it were, an association
arising as a habit formation, or does every idea partake essentially
of a motor character? Do purely cognitive states give rise to such
movements, or does the movement impulse depend more particularly
upon the affective consciousness accompanying the cognitive states?
And in how far do given kinds of expressive movements depend upon
certain ideational types (c.f. page 95)? Thus, what is the
influence of the visual image upon the gestures for "up," "down,"
etc.? And then, are these involuntary movements, when not noted,
truly unconscious, or merely not attended to,----in other words, are
they beyond the pale of consciousness or merely "at the fringe?" The
various writers speak almost without exception of unconscious
movements in the strict sense of the term. My own introspections,
however, have led me to doubt whether they are quite unconscious.
Since I have attained some practice I am able to describe in detail
(under conditions of objective control) my involuntary movements, no
matter how slight, even down to mere muscular tensions. None of my
subjects, however, has as yet succeeded in this. It is no very easy
matter to be on the lookout for some unknown movements which might
eventually occur, while attempting to concentrate attention to the
utmost upon a certain definite ideational content, for this very
dividing of attention effects a decrease in the force of the
movement, and thus makes it all the more difficult to discover. From
my ow