to Cape Colony, the latter being mainly distributed between the
Stormberg, Colesberg, Kimberley, and Mafeking commandos. Of the Boer
leaders, some, notably De Wet, had realised the folly of remaining on
the defensive, but Joubert, whose appreciation of the conditions of
the contest can be judged from his circular letter printed at the
close of this chapter, was opposed to any forward movement, and
Joubert's views prevailed. Sir Redvers Buller personally, although the
Field Intelligence staff in South Africa did not agree with his
estimate, assessed the strength of the enemy in the field at far
higher figures than those above given;[285] and on 9th January he
telegraphed to the Secretary of State that there was reason to believe
that it was not less than 120,000 men, of whom 46,000 were in Natal.

[Footnote 285: The views of the Field Intelligence department
as to the actual strength of the enemy may be gathered from
Lord Roberts' report to the War Office on 12th January, that
in his opinion the total strength against us had never been
more than 80,000 men (telegram to Secretary of State for
War).]

[Sidenote: Buller's memorandum for Lord Roberts of Dec. 28th/99.]

Lord Roberts received on landing a memorandum, written by Sir R.
Buller at Frere camp on 28th December, the following extracts from
which will serve to explain the views of Sir Redvers:

"The whole Tugela river is a strong position; there is no
question of turning it; the only open question is whether one
part of it is easier to get through than another. I tried
Colenso, because, though unaided I could not have forced the
defile north of Colenso, it was the only place in the whole line
in which Sir George White's force could aid me in my advance from
the Tugela. I am now waiting for reinforcements, and am going to
try and force a passage at Potgieters Drift. If I can find water
to use in the subsequent advance, I think I ought to just pull
through: but the difficulties are very great. If I succeed, it
should be about the 12th January, and if then I join hands with
Sir G. White, I think together we shall be able to force the
enemy to retire and so free Sir G. White's force."

After stating that, in the event of success in the relief of
Ladysmith, he hoped to be able to spare a division from the Natal
army, and after referring Lord Robert