f these divisions the cavalry was withdrawn and included in the
cavalry division. Two naval guns were attached to each of the 6th and
9th divisions, but the remainder of the naval brigade, under Captain
J. Bearcroft, R.N., was at first ordered to remain with Lord Methuen.
The only corps troops retained by the Commander-in-Chief were the 15th
company Southern division R.G.A., the 1st Telegraph division, and the
balloon section, Royal Engineers. Rimington's Guides were distributed
amongst the various columns. The total effective strength of the
force, including the Guards' and 9th brigades, which remained before
Magersfontein to hold Cronje in check, was a little under 40,000 men
and 108 guns. The battalions at this time much varied in strength,
those of the 13th brigade averaged but 721, those of the Highland
brigade 780, the battalions of the 15th brigade were as high as 900,
and the Guards' battalions reached the figure of 938. The cavalry
regiments had an average of about 473 all ranks. For details of units,
see Appendix 10.

[Footnote 314: Lt.-General C. Tucker.]

[Sidenote: Reinforcements asked for.]

The intelligence of the failure of Sir R. Buller's operations against
Spion Kop forced the Field-Marshal on 28th January to telegraph to the
War Office that the despatch of the 8th division and another cavalry
brigade from England had become advisable, but, in deference to
reluctance felt by the Cabinet to denude further the home garrisons of
regular infantry, Lord Roberts suspended his request for them at
present until the result of later operations in Natal should be
known.[315] The brigade of cavalry was at once promised.

[Footnote 315: The 8th division was again definitely asked
for on 28th February, and then granted.]

[Sidenote: Demonstrations westward. MacDonald seizes Koodoesberg, Feb.
5th, 1900.]

Lord Roberts did not wait for it, for his advance could no longer be
delayed. As the troops were pushed forward successively, it was
certain that the enemy must become aware of the assembly of so large a
number very close to Magersfontein, even though the concentration was
screened by Lord Methuen's and General Clements' forces. It was
essential, therefore, to distract Cronje's attention from the flank,
eastward of which the Field-Marshal meant to aim his blow. Nor were
there lacking ample excuses for demonstrations to the westward. The
very unsatisfactory condition of the districts