a great turning movement, and warranted
the confident hope that the tide of fortune would turn in favour of
the British flag. It was his desire that the troops, about to engage
in this fresh enterprise, should reap to the full the benefit of the
practical experiences of the earlier actions of the war, both as
regards the special conditions of fighting in South Africa and the
modifications in tactics necessitated by the introduction of smokeless
powder and magazine small-bore rifles. He also recognised that the
tasks he was about to assign to his mounted troops would tax their
horses to the utmost, and was anxious to impress on all concerned the
necessity for the most careful horsemastership. He therefore issued
the following instructions:--

NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE.

INFANTRY.

As it is desirable that full advantage should be taken of the
experience gained during the past three months by our troops in South
Africa, the following notes are issued for the guidance of all who may
find themselves in command of a force (large or small) on service in
the field.

We have to deal with an enemy possessing remarkable mobility,
intimately acquainted with the country, thoroughly understanding how
to take advantage of ground, adept in improvising cover, and most
skilful in the use of their weapons.

Against such an enemy any attempt to take a position by direct attack
will assuredly fail. The only hope of success lies in being able to
turn one or both flanks, or what would, in many instances, be equally
effective, to threaten to cut the enemy's line of communication.
Before any plan of attack can be decided upon, the position must be
carefully examined by reconnoitring parties, and every endeavour must
be made to obtain all possible information about it from the people of
the country. It must, however, be remembered that the position
ostensibly occupied is not always the one the Boers intend to defend;
it is often merely a decoy, a stronger position in the vicinity having
previously been prepared upon which they move rapidly, and from which
they can frequently bring a destructive fire to bear upon the
attacking line. Their marvellous mobility enables them to do this
without much risk to themselves, and also to be in strength at any
point of the position that may be seriously threatened. It follows,
therefore, that our object should be to cripple the mobility of the
Boers, and to effect this, next to infl