raw the less attention as long as the force at and near
Colesberg was formidable and active. When the right time was
come--that is, as it worked out, when French handed over to Clements
those who were to remain round Colesberg--all the rest, including the
new division, could be carried from Naauwpoort junction and so on
towards the Riet, being, during their passage, far in rear of the
fighting line around Colesberg. It will be easily seen from the map
how greatly the trace of the railways facilitated the removal of
strong bodies from the Naauwpoort--Colesberg region to the Kimberley
railway, the whole movement being screened by the fighting forces left
round Colesberg.

[Sidenote: Further causes of success.]

Cronje himself was a Transvaaler, and his principal line of supply
ran northwards through the ground held by the besiegers of Kimberley.
Although, therefore, many of those under him were from the Orange Free
State and likely to be disturbed by a movement against Bloemfontein,
any such danger appeared to be remote as long as the Orange river,
both at Norval's Pont and Bethulie, was in the hands of the Boers. His
retreat northwards was at all events quite secure. The reports of the
arrival of ever increasing numbers south of Lord Methuen's camp seemed
to imply that, whatever might be done elsewhere, his entrenchments
were to be again attacked, and as he wished for nothing better than
this, he very naturally interpreted the information he received in
accordance with his hopes. It was not difficult, therefore, to impose
on him, in this respect also, by demonstrations against the opposite
flank to that which Lord Roberts intended--not to attack but to pass
by on his route northwards--so placing his army ultimately athwart
Cronje's line of retreat. The execution of this scheme, the guiding
principles of which have thus been sketched, will perhaps now be more
easily followed in detail. It only remains to add here that the
fictitious orders, cancelled by cypher telegrams, were actually sent,
and were very useful in their effect of imposing on the Boers.

[Sidenote: A railway scheme. Facilities and difficulties.]

The interest of the whole scheme for modern soldiers lies in the fact
that it was an application of very ancient principles of war to the
times of railways and telegraphs. Everything turned upon the
facilities afforded by the railways on the one hand, upon the
difficulties which the railway authorities had to