surmount on the
other, and, above all, upon this: that where accumulation of rolling
stock, vast in proportion to the resources of the country, had to be
collected from every direction upon a single line, it needed much tact
and management to make the preparations required to enable the
transport of troops, when once begun, to continue rapidly without
interruption, and yet not to disclose the secret. Engines were more
essential than anything else, and to obtain them in sufficient number
the Port Elizabeth lines had to be swept almost bare, although the
supply of the troops round Naauwpoort junction and Colesberg largely
depended on that railway. It may, therefore, be imagined how hard it
was to placate the zealous civil officials, who, without understanding
why it was done, found themselves deprived of the very instruments
needed for their work, and had as best they could to make bricks
without straw. All the organisation of this fell upon Colonel
Girouard, who had promised Lord Roberts to have the immense volume of
stores necessary for the campaign, as well as the troops, delivered at
the assigned stations by February 14th, on two conditions: one, that
absolute secrecy as to all that was being done should be strictly
observed, Girouard himself naming the men to whom he must disclose his
plans; the other, that when he had received his instructions as to the
places where delivery was to be made by the railway these should not
be changed. Unfortunately this latter condition could not be kept.
Honey Nest Kloof, which had been at first selected as the place for
the great camp and depot, was found to be inadequately supplied with
water, so that Graspan and Belmont inevitably replaced it.

[Sidenote: The nature of task.]

The fact that, with the exception of the two Generals, Kelly-Kenny and
French, who knew the scheme after French's visit to Cape Town, none of
the officers in the trains had any idea where they were going or what
was intended, and did not realise what was essential for the success
of the undertaking, occasionally gave trouble to the railway
authorities. For instance, water for the troops bivouacking at Graspan
was some two miles from the station, but the water indispensable for
the service of the railway was close to the spot where the
disembarkation from the carriages had taken place. Colonel Girouard
himself found to his horror that this, without which he could send no
train forward, was being freely expe