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ord Roberts to Secretary of State, 27th January, 1900.] [Footnote 289: Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 30th January, 1900.] [Footnote 290: Minutes of Evidence of War Commission, Vol. I., pp. 460-1.] "Before leaving England I had practically determined that the advance must be through the Orange Free State, but by one, not by three lines through Cape Colony, as was originally intended;[291] and the western line commended itself to me for the following reasons: [Footnote 291: This would seem to be a misapprehension. Sir R. Buller's intention had been to advance by Bethulie (see page 411).] "1. It was on that line only that we had possession of a railway bridge over the Orange river: "2. It was by that line only that Kimberley could be relieved in time, and had Kimberley fallen, Mafeking must have fallen also: "3. It was by that line only I could deal with the Boer forces in detail, and defeat Cronje before he could be reinforced. [Sidenote: Lord Roberts' explanation why he chose the route he took.] "Both the Norval's Pont and Bethulie bridges were in the hands of the enemy, and by the time I had forced them back into the Orange Free State, and had been able to repair either of these bridges (which I was certain would be destroyed, and which actually happened), and I had occupied Bloemfontein, I should have between me and Kimberley, not only Cronje, but the whole of the Boer force which was not engaged in Natal. I should have then been obliged either to march across the veld against this increased force, or to have transported the greater portion of my troops by rail to the Modder River camp (if the railway could have been kept intact, which was hardly likely, seeing how weakly it was necessarily guarded and the number of Boers who would have been available to destroy it), and then to turn the Magersfontein position. To carry out either of these operations, and for the onward advance on an extended front to Pretoria, at least the same amount of transport would have been required as was needed for the march from Modder River camp to Bloemfontein. But this would not have been forthcoming had I adopted the railway line to Bloemfontein and not organised the system of transport direct
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