s to instructions issued from
time to time to Sir F. Forestier-Walker as regards the general plan of
his operations in the western theatre, Sir R. Buller continued:

"You will see that my original idea was to bring Methuen back,
but as his task has grown harder I have proposed a railway to
Jacobsdal and thence to Bloemfontein. I think that for many
reasons you would find such a line of advance easier and quicker
than one up the main railway. Up that line the enemy will have a
rail behind them, and will tear it up as you advance, and occupy
positions that you must attack and from which they can escape. If
I could have had my own way on arrival I should have pushed
through Bethulie to Bloemfontein, but the fat was in the fire
before I got out. Kimberley I believe will be saved. Ladysmith is
a terrible nut to crack, but I hope it will (? be relieved). Then
I would propose to attack Bloemfontein from Kimberley, and I
think an army holding Bloemfontein based on Kimberley will be
better off than one which holds Bloemfontein but has allowed
Kimberley to be again invested. Time, after all, is in our
favour. The Boers cannot reproduce their horses which are being
used up, and if they lose their mobility, they lose their power.
I believe that French and Gatacre are strong enough to prevent
the spread of disaffection, and that when the 7th division
arrives they will join hands, and the disaffected Dutch will go
back to their homes."

[Sidenote: Sir Redvers telegraphs, Jan. 10th, 1900, that he is about
to try to reach Ladysmith by Potgieters or Trickhardts.]

This written memorandum was supplemented by a telegram, in which
General Buller reported that he was leaving Chieveley the next day
(11th January), and would operate towards Ladysmith from Potgieters
Drift or Trickhardts Drift. From the larger point of view Lord Roberts
would have preferred that the forward movement in Natal should have
been delayed a little longer; but he felt that he was not in a
position to judge how far Sir R. Buller was committed to an immediate
stroke, or whether the situation before him or Ladysmith itself
demanded prompt action. He decided, therefore, to give General Buller
an absolutely free hand to carry out the operations he had
planned.[286]

[Footnote 286: See p. 461, Vol. I., Minutes of Evidence
before War Commission.]