.A.A.G., and from the reports of scouts,
patrols, and strong reconnoitring parties, showed that the enemy's
main line of defence ran along the foot of the hills stretching from
Langeberg farm to Magersfontein Hill. It was known that the Boers had
outposts on the low ridge, that they held Moss Drift, that they had
detachments to the south of the river, and that near Langeberg farm
and Brown's Drift were laagers of considerable extent. The General
estimated the numbers opposed to him at 12,000 to 15,000 men, with six
or eight guns.

[Sidenote: Plans proposed and rejected.]

Various projects for the further movement upon Kimberley had been
weighed and found wanting. A purely frontal attack upon the kopjes
between Langeberg and Magersfontein Hill involved the crossing of a
wide extent of open and level ground, with the danger of a
counter-attack by the enemy from the low ridge held by the left wing
of Cronje's army. To the west of Langeberg farm the country was so
waterless as to preclude any attempt in that direction. A flank march
up the Modder river to Brown's Drift, and thence to Abon's Dam, about
16 miles N.E. of Jacobsdal, seemed feasible, for the British column
would turn the works of Magersfontein and then fall upon the eastern
flank of Spytfontein, the northern of the two lines of heights which
lay athwart the railway between the Modder and Kimberley. But before
the relieving column could thus swing clear of Magersfontein and
strike off thirteen or fourteen miles to the eastward through a
country cut up by wire fences, the consequent exposure of Modder River
camp, with all its accumulation of stores and its newly-restored
railway bridge, had to be taken into account. Lord Methuen considered
its safety, and that of the line of communication along the railway to
the nearest post at Honey Nest Kloof, essential to his enterprise. Now
the adequate defence of the station and this section of the railway
required a far larger detachment than he could spare from his division
engaged in making a flank march and an attack on Spytfontein. The idea
of assaulting the left flank of the Boers was discussed, but
abandoned, because it was thought that the bush-covered ground would
diminish the effect of the artillery and cause an undue loss of life
among the infantry. Therefore, it was finally decided to carry the
heights of Magersfontein, and after their occupation and entrenchment
to make a turning movement against the left flan