, after a careful
reconnaissance by telescope, he had come to the conclusion that "a
direct assault upon the enemy's position at Colenso would be too
costly," and that he had therefore decided to "force the passage of
Potgieters drift."
[Footnote 218: See map No. 3.]
[Sidenote: News of Magersfontein and Stormberg changes his purpose,
Dec. 13th.]
Only a few hours later telegrams, reporting the serious check suffered
by Lord Methuen at Magersfontein, were placed in his hands. This
disquieting intelligence, coupled with news of the reverse at
Stormberg, in the opinion of Sir Redvers Buller, so entirely changed
the situation that he no longer considered the movement by Potgieters
advisable. "This operation," he told the Secretary of State, "involved
the complete abandonment of my communications, and in the event of
want of success, the risk that I might share the fate of Sir George
White, and be cut off from Natal. I had considered that, with the
enemy dispirited by the failure of their plans in the west, the risk
was justifiable, but I cannot think that I ought now to take such a
risk. From my point of view it will be better to lose Ladysmith
altogether than to throw open Natal to the enemy."[219]
[Footnote 219: See despatch, Sir R. Buller to Secretary of
State for War, dated 13th December, 1899.]
[Sidenote: Informs Sir George that Dec. 17th is probable date of
attack on Colenso. Sir George prepares to sally out.]
Accordingly, on the 13th December he heliographed to Ladysmith: "Have
been forced to change my plans; am coming through via Colenso and
Onderbrook Spruit"; and later on the same day, in reply to an enquiry
from Sir George White as to the probable date of his advance, he
informed that officer: "Actual date of attack depends upon
difficulties met with, probably 17th December." On receipt of these
messages the commander of the Ladysmith garrison, after detailing some
weak detachments to continue manning the defences, prepared the whole
of the rest of his troops for fighting their way out southward under
his personal command, at the moment of the attack on Colenso by the
relieving army. No further notification of the date of that attack
reached him until the 16th, when he was informed by the
Commander-in-Chief that he had "tried Colenso yesterday and failed."
The sound of very heavy artillery firing on the 15th was, it is true,
heard in Ladysmith, but the Colenso position had
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