gade division, although directed by the written
operation orders to follow the 4th brigade (Lyttelton) in order to
enfilade the kopjes north of the iron bridge, had received verbal
instructions from Sir R. Buller through Colonel Long that at least one
of his batteries was to cross the river with Hart's brigade. He
accordingly marched with his guns on the right rear of the 5th
brigade.

[Sidenote: Hart's instructions, guide, and map.]

Major-General Hart had been provided with a tracing of a map, a Kaffir
guide, and a colonist as interpreter to assist him in finding "the
Bridle Drift immediately west of the junction of the Doornkop Spruit
and the Tugela," by which he was to cross the river. This map was a
plane-table sketch, prepared by an engineer officer shortly before the
action. It was an attempt to fill into a farm survey, made for land
registration, as many of the topographical features as could be seen
from a distance. Unfortunately it had not been verified by any close
reconnaissance of the river, and thus both the sketch and the orders
were misleading. A Bridle Drift, used by natives in the dry season of
the winter but uncertain in the summer, did indeed exist, although on
that particular day it was unfordable. But the sketch, on which the
order relied, showed the Doornkop Spruit as running into the Tugela at
the western bend of the remarkable loop which that river makes to the
north-west, about one mile east of E. Robinson's farm; it showed,
moreover, the Bridle Drift close to the junction of the spruit, and
placed, also immediately to the west of the Drift, another loop of the
river. On all three of these points the sketch was defective. Only a
short but deep donga enters the river at this western end of the loop,
near 2 on map No. 15. The Doornkop Spruit joins the river at the
eastern, not the western bend of the loop. The Bridle Drift lies, not
near to the western bend of the loop, but a mile to the westward.
Finally, the Tugela makes no second loop for several miles to the
westward. The effect of these topographical errors in the map, and in
the written orders was further enhanced by another serious
misapprehension. Major-General Hart had been informed on the previous
evening that the Kaffir guide lived close to the drift where he was to
cross, and could be relied on not to make any mistake about it.
Unfortunately the native misunderstood his instructions, or had been
given wrong instructions, for he conc