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wever, the respective directions assigned by Sir R. Buller to the guns and the infantry brigade were found to diverge, and General Barton accordingly detailed two companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers to continue with the guns as escort. At 5.30 a.m. the Brigadier halted his command, his leading battalion being then about two miles from the river. [Sidenote: Col. Long's mission.] The specific task assigned to No. 1 brigade division by the operation orders was, "to proceed to a point from which it can prepare the crossing for the 2nd brigade." Sir Redvers Buller, at the conference of the previous afternoon, had thought it desirable to supplement and anticipate this written order with verbal instructions as to the exact point at which the batteries should come into action. He had intended to convey to Colonel Long by these verbal instructions that the purposed preparation should be carried out at long range. But the impression left on the subordinate officer's mind, when he left the conference, was that medium range was meant. As he rode therefore with Lieut.-Colonel Hunt and Lieut. Ogilvy, R.N., at the head of the field artillery, now marching in battery column, Long was on the look out for a suitable position at a distance of not less than 2,000 yards and not more than 2,500 yards from Fort Wylie, the southernmost of the kopjes which had been pointed out as the brigade division's targets. Had a site between those limits been selected, the batteries would not have been seriously molested by the Boer riflemen entrenched on the far bank of the river, and could, by superior strength, have crushed the enemy's gunners posted among the Colenso kopjes. [Sidenote: Long brings his guns into action, after Boer guns open on Hart, _i.e._, about 6.15 a.m.] It was not until after 6 a.m. that Long arrived at the distance from the river at which he had intended to come into action. The batteries were still at a walk, with the Naval guns in rear, when suddenly heavy firing was heard on the left flank. It was evident that part of the British force was closely engaged. Anxious to afford immediate effective support, and deceived by the light as to his actual distance from Fort Wylie, Long ordered Hunt's brigade division to push on, and come into action at a point about eighty yards to the north of a broad and shallow donga, which runs at right angles to the railway and was just in front of his guns. Ogilvy's Naval guns were to foll
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