m the long Boer trench to the north,
occupied by the Standerton commando. The battalions were also
enfiladed from trenches on the right and left. At the time it was only
possible to guess from the course of the bullets where these shelter
trenches were. The left half-battalions temporarily obtained a certain
amount of cover from the bank of the river. The right half-battalions,
when a little further on, gained for the moment some shelter from a
long, narrow underfeature, towards the centre of the loop. With the
exception of the 1st Border regiment, which was on the extreme left,
the units rapidly intermingled. This mixture of commands was soon
increased when the left half-battalions of the Dublin Fusiliers and
Connaught Rangers, followed by two companies of the Border regiment,
came up. They had been ordered to cross the donga, near 2 on map No.
15, and move eastward in succession in support of those in front. The
passage to the flank in file of these half-battalions was carried out
under a severe and accurate cross musketry fire, while the Boer guns
continued to make excellent practice with shrapnel on the extended
British lines.

[Footnote 229: It is noteworthy that Major-General Hart is
emphatic in asserting that "he did not cross the Doornkop
Spruit." It will be understood from the explanation given in
the text that he did not cross what was marked for him on the
map as the spruit. The map was wrong. He crossed the spruit
shown as "Doornkop Spruit" on map 15.]

[Sidenote: The guide disappears.]

As the Kaffir guide had disappeared, the actual position of the ford
was unknown. Major C. R. R. McGrigor, King's Royal Rifle Corps,
General Hart's brigade-major, had ridden up the river in search of the
Bridle Drift, and, finding a spot where there appeared to be a ford,
entered the river on foot, but was soon out of his depth, and was
compelled to swim back to the right bank.

[Sidenote: Hart's brigade struggles forward up the loop.]

Meanwhile parties of the Connaught Rangers, the Dublin, and
Inniskilling, Fusiliers, had worked their way up the loop by a series
of rushes in extended order at about three to four paces interval,
suffering heavy loss. Each group followed the nearest officer,
irrespective of his corps, of its own volition, and worked forward, as
it were, automatically, the rushes, however, varying in length,
sometimes carrying the men through the gro