rise. Moreover, the ground to the east was
unfavourable for any sortie from Ladysmith, and in a telegram dated
the 30th November, Sir George White had definitely reported that he
could give most help to the relieving force if it advanced via
Onderbrook Spruit (_i.e._, by the western of the two possible
Colenso-Ladysmith roads) or via Springfield and Potgieters drift.

[Sidenote: Sir Redvers' view of the choice open to him.]

Sir Redvers thought that he must either assault the strongly
entrenched position of Colenso or make a flank march to Potgieters. If
that drift and the Brakfontein Nek were seized, the way would be
opened to the rolling plain which lies westward of Ladysmith, between
that town and the Tabanyama range. This course, though it presented
difficulties of its own, was tactically by far the easier method of
attempting the task before him. On the other hand, this flank movement
would, for some days, expose the British line of communication with
the coast.

[Sidenote: He decides to march by Potgieters, 7th Dec./99.]

A review of all these considerations led General Buller to decide in
favour of the route via Potgieters drift, and on the 7th December he
so informed Sir George White. He told him that he hoped to start on
the 12th, and would probably take five days in bringing the operation
to a successful conclusion. Sir George, in reply, reported by
heliograph that he proposed to sally out from Ladysmith the night
before the relieving force attempted its crossing of the Tugela at
Potgieters, and to "work towards you as far as I can." He added: "As
time is an all-important factor in co-operation, you will, I am sure,
inform me of any change." On the 11th December, Sir Redvers answered
that he could not be certain of his dates till his transport arrived,
so that Sir George had better not try to help him until the relieving
force had reached Lancer's Hill,[218] a point about six or seven miles
west of Ladysmith, "unless you feel certain where I am." This limit
was imposed by General Buller, as he was unwilling that Sir G. White's
troops should be committed to a serious action against the enemy until
his own army was within supporting distance. On the 12th December Sir
Redvers moved the 6th brigade, accompanied by two 4.7-in. and six
12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval guns, to a camp two miles north of Chieveley, so
as to cover the flank march to the west. He sent that day a despatch
to the Secretary of State reporting that