a rule,
easy slopes and gentle gradients.
[Sidenote: Difficulty of finding out where the Boers were.]
In ascertaining the exact localities occupied by the enemy, Sir
Redvers Buller was handicapped by many circumstances. A considerable
space along the river could in the daytime only be approached by
reconnoitrers under the close view and fire of the picked riflemen of
the veld. The whole of the original Intelligence staff and the
subordinate personnel of scouts and guides, organised for the Natal
Field Force before the outbreak of the war, had been left locked up
with the troops in Ladysmith. The nucleus of a fresh Intelligence
staff had, however, been started by 2nd Lieut. A. N. Campbell, R.A.,
and was subsequently taken over by Mr. T. K. Murray, C.M.G., after the
disbandment of his corps of scouts. The reports of Mr. Murray, who was
subsequently created a K.C.M.G. for his services, as well as
information sent out by runners, heliograph, and pigeon post from
Ladysmith, agreed that the main body of Botha's force was concentrated
immediately in front of Colenso. A reconnaissance, suggested by a
Ladysmith message, dated 17th November, had been conducted by Captain
H. De la P. Gough towards Potgieters drift on the 29th November, but
had failed to get touch with the enemy. Intelligence scouts had,
however, reported the Boer commandos at Potgieters and Skiet's drifts,
and it was also known that Boer patrols were watching the intermediate
crossings. It might therefore be assumed that the whole line of the
river was kept under Boer observation.
It will be seen that the topographical conditions, though not at the
time fully known, made it impossible to turn either flank of the great
crescent of hills which barred an advance on Ladysmith. On the other
hand, it seemed probable that a sudden march, eastward or westward,
would find some passage of the river, and of the natural parapet
beyond, unentrenched and but slightly guarded. An examination of the
map, and a study of the country to the eastward, showed that a flank
movement in that direction would be compelled to follow a circuitous
route, and to traverse broken ground, covered with bush and
exceedingly favourable to ambuscade and to surprise attacks. Sir
Redvers judged that to commit troops, untrained to manoeuvre over
terrain of this description and hampered by many ox-wagons, to a
rather long flank march in presence of a mobile enemy, would be too
dangerous an enterp
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