ancers, with G. battery and the greater part of the mounted infantry,
to the eastward, hoping to turn the enemy's left flank. In a few
minutes the sudden roar from the trenches warned him that fighting had
begun, and soon afterwards his patrols were shot at from the low ridge
which stretches from Magersfontein Hill to the Modder. He accordingly
ordered G. battery to shell this ridge from the ground shown on the
map, No. 13. In twenty minutes, the defenders had been at least
temporarily silenced. About the time that G. battery opened
Major-General Babington sent the 9th Lancers also eastwards, with
instructions to force their way along the river to Brown's Drift and
thus turn the enemy's left. Very early in the morning they reached
Moss Drift, but their repeated efforts to advance further up the
Modder were beaten back by musketry. While G. battery was employed
against the low ridge, it became evident to Major-General Babington
that the Highlanders not only had failed to carry the Magersfontein
heights, but that they required instant reinforcement. He accordingly
desired Major R. Bannatine-Allason, the battery commander, to move
north-east over the scrubby ground, and not to come into action until
he was stopped by the bullets or could get a clear view of what was
going on at the front. The battery, with an escort of 12th Lancers and
mounted infantry, advanced at a trot, and its commander, having
obtained information from scattered Highlanders, pushed on towards the
low knoll called on the map Horse Artillery Hill, the name by which it
became known during the battle. Whilst the wire fence[205] which ran
sixty or seventy yards to the south of Horse Artillery Hill was being
cut to clear the way the battery came under infantry fire.[206] The
commander, on reconnoitring the knoll in preparation for the battery,
decided to run the guns up by hand and place them on the reverse
slope.[207] Having taken up this situation he was able to continue in
action there for twenty-four hours with the loss of only four men. The
selected spot was 2,200 yards from the Boer trenches at the foot of
Magersfontein Hill, and 1,400 yards from the low ridge, which was a
few feet higher than Horse Artillery Hill. In consequence of the
position being on the reverse slope there was, between the hill on
which the guns were, and the low ridge, "dead ground." That is to say,
that no shells from the battery could reach the space which lay
nearest in the va