uld
have succeeded had not exceptional ill-fortune attended its execution.
Several of the causes of failure stand out conspicuously in the
narrative: the mistake of the guides in taking the longer route, which
unduly fatigued the men; the failure to realise that the Kissieberg
was within striking distance, when the cross roads near Van Zyl's farm
were reached; the premature withdrawal of the five companies of one of
the battalions from the attack, and the subsequent shelling of the
British infantry who still clung to the hill. Without these
accumulated mishaps a blow would in all probability have been struck
at the enemy, such as would have had an important influence on the
general situation in South Africa. Yet it cannot be held that chance
was alone responsible for this miscarriage. A long night march to be
followed by a night attack involves, under the most favourable
circumstances, a considerable element of hazard, and it is therefore
essential that every possible precaution should be taken to obviate
mistakes and to ensure that the column should not, in its mission to
surprise, be itself taken at a disadvantage. Careful reconnaissance by
the staff of the route to be followed can, therefore, never be
neglected with impunity. If a staff officer had examined beforehand
the Steynsburg road, at least as far as the branch track which it was
intended to follow, and if he had been made responsible for the
supervision of the guides, the mistakes as to the route would in all
probability have been avoided. This omission is the more remarkable in
that one of the Intelligence staff, upon whom the duty of this
reconnaissance would naturally have devolved, was well acquainted with
the ground in the neighbourhood of Stormberg. It is perhaps doubtful
whether in view of the fatigue shown by the troops on their arrival at
Roberts' farm, and the uncertainty of the staff as to the situation,
it was wise to persist in the enterprise. In any case, it is clear
that the neglect to change the formation of the column, and to send
out flank and advance guards when dawn appeared whilst the movement
was being carried along a road surrounded by hills, was a dangerous
and unnecessary risk. Finally, the abandonment of large detachments of
infantry, when retreat was ordered, implies a serious lack of
supervision both by the staff and by the officers then left in command
of the battalions. Yet in weighing the responsibility for these
errors, it must