nce in making preparations
for war, which must be of vital importance to him and to the country
when he has to bear the great responsibility of command. I used
to say that it would not be just to me to deprive me of such
opportunities for education, and I doubt not all my successors will
share that feeling. Thus, what may prove to be of the greatest
benefit to the military service has finally come out of that evil
of "want of confidence" in an ordnance chief.
When in command of the Division of the Atlantic in 1886-7, I made
a careful estimate of the aggregate strength of the war garrisons
required for the fortifications and armament recommended by the
Endicott board, and of the peace garrisons which would be absolutely
required for the care of the new works and for the instruction of
the militia artillery reserves. It was found that the addition of
two regiments to the present artillery strength of the army would
provide the requisite force. Hence a measure was formulated and
submitted to Congress to convert the present five regiments into
seven, with some proportionate reduction in the number of officers,
intended to promote efficiency and economy. That measure has
appeared to meet with the approval of nearly all concerned, but is
still pending in Congress. It is probably the most important
military measure now awaiting favorable action. The measure which
accompanies it for the reorganization of the infantry, though not
of so pressing necessity, is based upon sound military principles,
and is worthy of prompt and favorable action.
The first introduction of the policy of confining the warlike tribes
of Indians upon very restricted reservations necessarily caused
great discontent, especially among the younger men, who where thus
cut off from the sports of the chase and the still greater sport
of occasional forays into frontier settlements, which were the only
means known in Indian custom by which a young warrior could gain
a name and a position of honor in his tribe. Either through too
limited appropriations or bad management, the provisions furnished
for the support of the Indians, in lieu of those to which they had
been accustomed, proved inadequate. This caused the spirit of
discontent to increase and to become general among all ages. The
natural result was such a threat of war from the great Sioux nation
in the winter of 1890-91 as to necessitate the concentration of
quite a large army to meet the dang
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