ted for the supreme bench, or an engineer
to construct a great bridge, information is sought from the best
men of the profession concerned; but the opinions of politicians
were thought sufficient in determining the selection of major-
generals!

Again, the policy of the government required the capture and
occupation of all the important seaports and other places in the
South, and the permanent occupation and protection of all the
territory gained in military operations. Until near the close of
the war, neither the public nor the government seemed to have the
remotest conception of the fundamental fact that Confederate armies,
wherever they might go, instead of places and States, were the only
real objectives. Even some of the best Union generals were
constrained to act upon this popular heresy, contrary to their own
sound military judgment and education. Yet while this erroneous
"territorial" strategy was insisted on, no adequate conception was
formed of the vastly greater force required to hold all the territory
gained, and to push aggressive operations still further into the
heart of the South. Very rarely indeed were the Union armies large
enough, until near the end of the war, to assure success. The end
finally came through a long succession of desperate battles between
forces so nearly equal that decisive victory was impossible until
the weaker side finally became exhausted. Thus the aggregate loss
in men as well as in money was vastly greater than it would have
been if the Union had put forth its full strength and ended the
rebellion in two years instead of four.

It is true that some of the worst of these "blind guides" were men
supposed to have a very high military education. But if sound
military education had been at all general in the country, statesmen
would have known by what standard to judge of any one man's fitness
for high command.

It is true that no amount of military education can supply the
place of military genius or create a great commander. It may
possibly happen at any time that there may not be among all the
living graduates of West Point one Grant or Sherman or Sheridan,
or one Lee or Johnston or Jackson. So much greater the need of a
well-educated staff and a well-disciplined army. Nobody is wise
enough to predict who will prove best able to command a great army.
But it is the easiest thing in the world to tell who can best create
such an army and command its subdivisions, and