made in bringing
the regular army into close relations with the National Guard of
the several States, and in the employment of regular officers in
disseminating military education, both theoretical and practical,
throughout the country. These are among the most valuable services
the regular army can render in time of peace, and they should be
extended, if practicable, still further. Especially in the State
artillery, which must soon be organized for war service in the new
fortifications, instruction by regular officers will be indispensable,
and this can best be given in conjunction with the regular garrisons,
the same as in war service. It would also be well to perfect an
arrangement by which the new infantry regiments, when first taking
the field upon the breaking out of war, might be accompanied by
small bodies of regulars, to lead the way and indicate by example
what is to be done. Experience has shown that under such example
the rawest volunteers will be almost as stanch in battle as the
regulars themselves. The beneficial effect upon new troops of the
example of men who have before been in battle is very great. Hence
it is that old regiments should always be kept full by the addition
of recruits, rather than that the casualties of service be replaced
by new regiments.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

What constitutes valuable education, military no less than civil,
is often greatly misunderstood. Elementary education and practical
training are indispensable to everybody, while higher education
may be rather injurious than beneficial, unless it is so regulated
as to elevate the reasoning faculties and independence of thought,
rather than mere acquisition of knowledge. Some notable examples
of this have appeared in the military annals of this country, and
no doubt in the civil also. Men who had become famous military
scholars were total failures in war, not only as commanders in the
field, for which no amount of theoretical education alone can
qualify a man, but also as military advisers. This was apparently
because their elaborate studies had made them mere imitators or
copyists. Whatever originality of thought or power of invention
they ever possessed had ceased to exist from disuse. They could
plan and direct a campaign with absolute accuracy, according to
the teachings of the great masters, for the well-defined purpose
upon which those teachings had be