n the Eastern
States, where he had gone some time before. From this it resulted
that when the troops at Fort Sheridan were ordered into Chicago,
the execution of the order devolved upon subordinate officers, and
the troops were so dispersed as to be unable to act with the
necessary effect.

It having become apparent that the services of troops would probably
be required in the city of Chicago, and in anticipation of orders
from the President, instructions were telegraphed on July 2 to the
commanding general of the Department of the Missouri to make
preparations to move the garrison of Fort Sheridan to the Lake
Front Park in the city. The reply of his staff-officer, Colonel
Martin, showed that the department commander, Major-General Miles,
was not in Chicago, and the adjutant-general of the army did not
know where he was, but, after several inquiries by telegraph,
learned that the general had started that afternoon from Long Island
for Washington instead of Chicago. The next day (July 3), in the
President's room at the Executive Mansion, in reply to my suggestion
that his presence was needed with his command, General Miles said
he was subject to orders, but that in his opinion the United States
troops ought not to be employed in the city of Chicago at that
time. No reply was made by the President or the Secretary of War,
who was also present, to that expression of opinion, but the
President approved my further suggestion that General Miles should
return at once to his command. The general started by the first
train, but could not reach Chicago in time to meet the emergency.
It became necessary in the judgment of the President to order the
Fort Sheridan garrison into the city in the afternoon of the same
day (July 3).

UNITED STATES TROOPS IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO

The instructions given the day before about moving the troops to
Lake Front Park were not complied with. From that point they could
most readily have protected the sub-treasury, custom-house, post-
office, and other United States property, and also have acted in
a formidable body at any other point where their service might
properly have been required. But instead of that, the troops were
so dispersed that they could not act with much effect anywhere,
and could give no protection whatever to the vast amount of United
States property exposed to destruction. This error appears to have
resulted in some measure from the to