along the lines of all the Pacific roads, and direct the department
commanders to restore and maintain, by military force, traffic and
transportation over those roads.

MILITARY CONTROL OF THE PACIFIC RAILWAYS

For some time those lawless acts did not seem to result from any
general organization. But they gradually developed into the
formidable character of a wide-spread conspiracy and combination,
with recognized general leaders, to obstruct and prevent the due
execution of the laws of the United States respecting transportation
and interstate commerce. The principal center of this conspiracy,
and by far the most formidable combination, was in Chicago, where
the greatest material interests, both public and private, were at
stake, though many other important railroad centers and many thousand
miles of road were involved. There the insurrection was so great
in numbers and so violent in its acts as to require the most prompt
and energetic action of a very large force to suppress disorder,
protect public property, and execute the laws. The city police
were utterly powerless in such an emergency, and deputy United
States marshals, though employed without limit as to numbers, were
no more effective. The State militia were not called out in time
to meet the emergency. Hence nothing remained but for the National
Government to exercise the military power conferred upon it by the
Constitution and laws, so far as the same were applicable.( 1)
Fortunately, the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the
Constitution, although never before made effective in a similar
case, were found to give ample authority for the action then
required. Fortunately, also, the wise foresight of the government
in establishing a large military post at Fort Sheridan, near Chicago,
made a regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery
of artillery immediately available for service in that city. But,
unfortunately, the commanding general of that department was absent
from his command, where superior military capacity was so much
needed at that time. Although the troops west of the Mississippi
had been engaged for a long time, under the President's orders, in
overcoming the unlawful obstruction of railroad traffic above
referred to, the general appears not to have anticipated any
emergency which would in his judgment require or justify such use
of troops in his own department, and hence remained i