er of a general outbreak. In
the course of military operations, accidents rather than design on
either side occasioned some serious collisions between the troops
and the Indians, especially at Wounded Knee, resulting in desperate
conflict and much loss of life. But by very careful management on
the part of the commanding general in the field, Major-General
Miles, a general conflict was averted, and the Sioux made their
submission. They had had no general intention to go to war, if
they could avoid it without starvation. After a large sum of money
had been expended by the War Department in this way, the deficiencies
in food were supplied at about the same cost as would, if made in
advance, have removed the cause of war. The Indians gained their
point of getting as much food as they needed, and the War Department
paid the extra bills, but out of the same public treasury which
has so often been bled in that way.

TROUBLES WITH THE SIOUX INDIANS IN 1890-91

It was quite beyond the power of the War Department to guard against
a recurrence of that greatest danger of Indian wars--starvation of
the Indians. But long experience and accurate knowledge of Indian
character had suggested a method by which the other cause of
discontent among the young Indian warriors might be, at least in
a great measure, removed. That was by providing a legitimate method
by which their irrepressible love of military life and exploits
might be largely gratified, and, at the same time, those ambitious
young men transferred from the ranks of more or less probable savage
enemies to the ranks of friends and practically civilized allies.
Fortunately, the strongest trait of the Indian character, namely,
fidelity to the war chief, lent itself to this project. Long
experience had shown the existence of this Indian trait. In only
one solitary instance had the Indian scouts so long employed by
the army ever proved unfaithful, though often employed in hostilities
against their own tribes. Hence, if the ardent young warriors
could be induced to enlist for three years in the army, they would,
at least for that time, be converted from enemies into allies, even
against such of their own tribes as might refuse to enlist. Of
course the army must suffer somewhat, in its effective strength
for all purposes, during this experiment; for it is evident that
a company or troop of Indians would not be quite as valuable for
gener