Russell
fortunate. Seward at once accepted Russell's notification of June 2 as
ending British neutrality. While again insisting upon the essential
injustice of the original concession of belligerent rights to the South,
and objecting to some details in the instructions to the Admiralty, he
yet admitted that normal relations were again established and
acknowledged that the United States could no longer exercise a right of
search[1317]. July 4, Russell presented this paper to Parliament,
reading that portion in which Seward expressed his pleasure that the
United States could now enter again upon normal relations with Great
Britain[1318]. Two days later Russell wrote to Bruce that he had not
expected Seward to acknowledge the rightfulness of England's neutrality
position, pointed out that his Admiralty instructions were misunderstood
and were less objectionable than appeared and concluded by the
expression of a hope for the "establishment of a lasting and intimate
friendship between the two nations[1319]."

* * * * *

Great Britain, wrote the Russian Minister in Washington in January,
1860, was about to experience one of those "strokes of fortune" which
occurred but rarely in the history of nations, in the approaching
dissolution of the American Union. She alone, of all the nations of the
world, would benefit by it in the expansion of her power, hitherto
blocked by the might of the United States. Broken into two or more
hostile pieces America would be at the mercy of England, to become her
plaything. "The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internal
dissensions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience which
it has difficulty in disguising." Great Britain would soon, in return
for cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armed
support. For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of the
slaves. The break-up of the Union was no less than a disaster for all
nations save England, since hitherto the "struggle" between England and
the United States "has been the best guarantee against the ambitious
projects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon race[1320]."

This prophecy, made over a year in advance of events, was repeated
frequently as the crisis in America approached and during the first two
years of the war. Stoeckl was not solitary in such opinion. The French
Minister of Foreign Affairs held it also--and the French Emperor puzzled
himself in v