ain to discover why Great Britain, in furtherance of her own
interests, did not eagerly accept his overtures for a vigorous joint
action in support of the South[1321].

The preceding chapters of this work will have shown how unfounded was
such prophecy. Stoeckl was behind the times, knowing nothing,
apparently, of that positive change in British policy in the late
'fifties which resulted in a determination to cease opposition to the
expansion of American power. Such opposition was then acknowledged to
have been an error and in its place there sprang into being a conviction
that the might of America would tend toward the greatness of England
itself[1322]. In the months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War all
British governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of the
quarrel and toward conciliation of the two sections. No doubt there were
those in Great Britain who rejoiced at the rupture between North and
South, but they were not in office and had no control of British policy.

The war once begun, the Government, anxious to keep clear of it, was
prompt in proclaiming neutrality and hastened this step for fear of
maritime complications with that one of the belligerents, the North,
which alone possessed a naval force. But the British Ministry, like that
of every other European state, believed that a revolution for
independence when undertaken by a people so numerous and powerful as
that of the South, must ultimately succeed. Hence as the war dragged on,
the Ministry, pressed from various angles at home, ventured, with much
uncertainty, upon a movement looking toward mediation. Its desire was
first of all for the restoration of world peace, nor can any other
motive be discovered in Russell's manoeuvres. This attempt, fortunately
for America and, it may be believed, for the world, was blocked by cool
heads within the Ministry itself. There was quick and, as it proved,
permanent readjustment of policy to the earlier decision not to meddle
in the American crisis.

This very failure to meddle was cause of great complaint by both North
and South, each expectant, from divergent reasons, of British sympathy
and aid. The very anger of the North at British "cold neutrality" is
evidence of how little America, feeling the ties of race and sentiment,
could have understood the mistaken view-point of diplomats like Stoeckl,
who dwelt in realms of "reasons of state," unaffected by popular
emotions. Aside from race, which c