istration, which came into office in March of that year, issued a
statement saying that, good-faith assurances having been received from
the Brazil government that the understanding was fulfilled in letter and
spirit before the date set by the previous attorney-general, and the
entire amount of coffee disposed of to eighty dealers in thirty-three
cities, the suit would be dismissed.

In the United States Senate about the same time, Senator Norris renewed
his attack on "the international coffee trust". He charged that the
coffee sale was not as represented, but merely a transfer, and called
upon the Department of Justice for the facts, with names of the alleged
purchasers.

Attorney-General McReynolds, on May 7, 1913, declined to send to the
Senate the official correspondence in regard to the Brazil
coffee-valorization matter, because it was "incompatible with the public
interests." He did, however, send other papers on the subject. The
secretary of state sent copies of some correspondence; but the documents
were not made public. This ended the matter, although Senator Norris
called for a congressional investigation, charging that the
attorney-general had been handed a "gold brick".

Sielcken contented himself with remarking that the suit was a mistake in
the first place, and that it was a foregone conclusion the government
would be defeated. Also, he offered $5,000 to any one who could explain
the Norris bill.

Valorization, then, was started by the state of Sao Paulo in 1905, when
a law was passed authorizing the state to enter into an agreement with
the other Brazil states and the federal government for the adoption of
measures which would assure the valorization of coffee and facilitate a
propaganda abroad for increased consumption.

The states of Sao Paulo, Minas Geraes, and Rio de Janeiro proposed,
early in 1906, to withdraw from the markets such quantities of coffee as
would keep down exports and maintain profitable prices. The plan
comprehended the interested states borrowing about $75,000,000 from
European and United States bankers with which to buy up the surplus
coffee. To take care of interest and amortization, a tax of three francs
per bag of 132 pounds (about 57 cents) was to be levied on all coffee
exports, collectable at Santos and Rio de Janeiro. Further
coffee-planting was to be checked by enforcing the law which carried a
tax sufficiently high to operate toward restriction.

When it was understo