Berlin respecting Turkey; and if the Porte allows a
fourth Power (evidently England) to enter the Dardanelles, it will
incur the hostility of one of the three Powers (Russia). (5) They will
not oppose the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia "if it comes about
by the force of circumstances"; and will not allow Turkey to fortify the
Balkan Passes. Finally, by Article 6, they forbid any one of the
contracting Powers to occupy the Balkan Principalities. The compact held
good only for three years.

If these terms are correctly stated, the treaty was a great triumph for
Austria and Germany at the expense of Russia. It is not surprising that
the Czar finally broke away from the constraint imposed by the
Skiernewice compact. As we have seen, his conduct towards Bulgaria in
1885-86 brought him very near to a conflict with the Central Powers. The
mystery is why he ever joined them on terms so disadvantageous. The
explanation would seem to be that, like the King of Italy, he felt an
alliance with the "conservative" Powers of Central Europe to be some
safeguard against the revolutionary elements then so strong in Russia.

In the years 1886-87 that danger became less acute, and the dictates of
self-interest in foreign affairs resumed their normal sway. At the
beginning of the year 1887 Katkoff regained his influence over the mind
of the Czar by convincing him that the troubles in the Balkan Peninsula
were fomented by the statesmen of Berlin and Vienna in order to distract
his attention from Franco-German affairs. Let Russia and France join
hands, said Katkoff in effect, and then Russia would have a free hand in
Balkan politics and could lay down the law in European matters
generally.

In France the advantage of a Russian alliance was being loudly asserted
by General Boulanger--then nearing the zenith of his popularity--as also
by that brilliant leader of society, Mme. Adam, and a cluster of
satellites in the Press. Even de Giers bowed before the idea of the
hour, and allowed the newspaper which he inspired, _Le Nord_, to use
these remarkable words (February 20, 1887):

Henceforth Russia will watch the events on the Rhine, and
relegates the Eastern Question to the second place. The
interests of Russia forbid her, in case of another
Franco-German war, observing the same benevolent neutrality
which she previously observed. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg
will in no case permit a further weakening of F