ce in
September 1868 was not due to Sir Henry Rawlinson's despatch from London
(dated July 20, 1868) in favour of more vigorous action. It was due to
Lawrence's perception of the change brought about by Russian action in
the Khanate of Bokhara, near the Afghan border.]

Moreover, there is every reason to think that Shere Ali, with the
proneness of orientals to refer all actions to the most elemental
motives, attributed the change of front at Calcutta solely to fear. That
was the time when the Russian capture of Samarcand cowed the Khan of
Bokhara and sent a thrill through Central Asia. In the political
psychology of the Afghans, the tardy arrival at Cabul of presents from
India argued little friendship for Shere Ali, but great dread of the
conquering Muscovites.

Such, then, was the policy of "masterly inactivity" in 1863-68, cheap
for India, but excessively costly for Afghanistan. Lord Lawrence
rendered incalculable services to India before and during the course of
the Mutiny, but his conduct towards Shere Ali is certainly open to
criticism. The late Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India in the
Gladstone Ministry (1868-74), supported it in his work, _The Eastern
Question,_ on the ground that the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1855 pledged
the British not to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan[285]. But
uncalled for interference is one thing; to refuse even a slight measure
of help to an ally, who begs it as a return for most valuable services,
is quite another thing.

[Footnote 285: The Duke of Argyll, _op. cit._ vol. ii. p. 226 (London,
1879). For the treaty, see Parl. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 1 (1878),
p. 1.]

Moreover, the Viceroy himself was brought by the stern logic of events
implicitly to give up his policy. In one of his last official
despatches, written on January 4, 1869, he recognised the gain to Russia
that must accrue from our adherence to a merely passive policy in
Central Asian affairs. He suggested that we should come to a "clear
understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and
designs in Central Asia, and that it might be given to understand in
firm but courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in
the affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies
contiguous to our frontier."

This sentence tacitly implied a change of front; for any prohibition to
Russia to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan virtually involved
Britain's claim to exerci