ty of 1855,
which had bound his father to close friendship with the old Company
without binding the Company to intervene in his favour. That, said Shere
Ali, was a "dry friendship." He wanted a friendship more fruitful than
that of the years 1863-67, and a direct support to his dynasty whenever
he claimed it. The utmost concession that Lord Mayo would grant was that
the British Government would "view with severe displeasure any attempt
to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul, and rekindle civil
war[288]."

[Footnote 288: Argyll, _op. cit._ vol. ii. p. 263.]

It seems that Shere Ali thought lightly of Britain's "displeasure," for
he departed ill at ease. Not even the occasional presents of money and
weapons that found their way from Calcutta to Cabul could thenceforth
keep his thoughts from turning northwards towards Russia. At Umballa he
had said little about that Power; and the Viceroy had very wisely
repressed any feelings of anxiety that he may have had on that score.
Possibly the strength and cheeriness of Lord Mayo's personality would
have helped to assuage the Ameer's wounded feelings; but that genial
Irishman fell under the dagger of a fanatic during a tour in the Andaman
Islands (February 1872). His death was a serious event. Shere Ali
cherished towards him feelings which he did not extend to his successor,
Lord Northbrook (1872-76).

Yet, during that vice-royalty, the diplomatic action of Great Britain
secured for the Ameer the recognition of his claims over the northern
part of Afghanistan, as far as the banks of the Upper Oxus. In the
years 1870-72 Russia stoutly contested those claims, but finally
withdrew them, the Emperor declaring at the close of the latter year
"that such a question should not be a cause of difference between the
two countries, and he was determined it should not be so." It is further
noteworthy that Russian official communications more than once referred
to the Ameer of Afghanistan as being "under the protection of the Indian
Government[289]".

[Footnote 289: Argyll, _op. cit._ vol. ii. pp. 289, 292. For the Czar's
assurance that "extension of territory" was "extension of weakness," see
Parl. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 1 (1878), p. 101.]

These signal services of British diplomacy counted for little at Cabul
in comparison with the question of the dynastic guarantee which we
persistently withheld. In the spring of 1873, when matters relating to
the Afghan-Persian frontier had to b