y,
could have survived. Even so, Maiwand was one of the gravest disasters
ever sustained by our Indian army. It cost Burrows' force nearly half
its numbers; 934 officers and men were killed and 175 wounded. The
strange disproportion between these totals may serve as a measure of the
ferocity of Afghans in the hour of victory. Of the non-combatants 790
fell under the knives of the ghazis. The remnant struggled towards
Candahar, whence, on the 28th, General Primrose despatched a column to
the aid of the exhausted survivors. In the citadel of that fortress
there mustered as many as 4360 effectives as night fell. But what were
these in face of Ayub's victorious army, now joined by tribesmen eager
for revenge and plunder[323]?

[Footnote 323: S.H. Shadbolt, _The Afghan Campaigns of_ 1878-80, pp.
96-100. Parl. Papers, Afghanistan, No. 2 (1880), p. 21; No. 3, pp.
103-5; Lord Roberts, _op. cit._ vol. ii. pp. 333-5; Hensman, _op. cit._
pp. 553-4.]

In face of this disaster, the British generals in Northern Afghanistan
formed a decision commendable alike for its boldness and its sagacity.
They decided to despatch at once all available troops from Cabul to the
relief of the beleaguered garrison at Candahar. General Sir Frederick
Roberts had handed over the command at Cabul to Sir Donald Stewart, and
was about to operate among the tribes on the Afghan frontier when the
news of the disaster sent him hurrying back to confer with the new
commander-in-chief. Together they recommended the plan named above.

It involved grave dangers: for affairs in the north of Afghanistan were
unsettled; and to withdraw the rest of our force from Cabul to the
Khyber would give the rein to local disaffection. The Indian authorities
at Simla inclined to the despatch of the force at Quetta, comprising
seven regiments of native troops, from Bombay. The route was certainly
far easier; for, thanks to the toil of engineers, the railway from the
Indus Valley towards Quetta had been completed up to a point in advance
of Sibi; and the labours of Major Sandeman, Bruce, and others, had kept
that district fairly quiet[324]. But the troops at Quetta and Pishin
were held to be incapable of facing a superior force of victorious
Afghans. At Cabul there were nine regiments of infantry, three of
cavalry, and three mountain-batteries, all of them British or picked
Indian troops. On August 3, Lord Ripon telegraphed his permission for
the despatch of the Cabul field-forc